4. Politics and Water Policy: by Nicol, Alan & Mtisi, Sobona
1 Introduction 
Access to dnd mdnagement of water resources is 
inherently political Drawing on fieldwork from the 
Sustainable Livelihoods in Southern Africa 
programme, largely undertaken in Zimbabwe, with 
some additional material from South Africa and 
Mozambique, this article examines the politics 
surrounding water resources and policy change in 
southern Africa and reaches some tentative 
conclusions of relevance to understanding current 
policy processes in regional water sector reform 
At the regional level, southern Africa has 
experienced rapid upheaval and socio-political 
change in the last 15 years. With the end of 
apartheid in South Africa, the post-independence 
political developments in Zimbabwe and the post- 
civil war situation in Mozambique, fundamental 
political and economic shifts have been made at 
ideological, institutional and policy levels. There is 
a new “regionalism” in which water resources 
feature very prominently (Chenje and Johnson 
1996). This new political landscape includes new 
structures and forms of state-society relations of 
enormous relevance to and impact on access to 
resources by poor people. In many cases, there 
have also been significant shifts in economic policy 
with macro-scale impacts, sometimes in tandem 
with wider economic impacts caused by drought in 
the region (see articles 1 and 2 of this Bullerin; 
Marquette 1997; Benson and Clay 1998). 
Reflecting this political “sea change”, much policy 
change has addressed fundamentals, in terms of 
ownership rights, restitution and the nature of 
historical oppression of particular groups, and the 
wider issue of the political enfranchisement and 
empowerment of the individual as a political actor 
(for South Africa, see for example, Abrams 1996; 
Kihato and Schniitz 2002). Central to much of this 
change has been a concern to address the poverty 
affecting much of the regional population of 200 
million (Turton and Henwood 2002); in many 
senses water reforms have been seen as essential to 
wider social and political development in countries 
of the region (Muller 2001). Not surprisingly, as 
policies with these fundamentals embedded within 
them have begun to translate into action at the 
scale of local and national institution-building, 
important contestations of formal and informal 
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how to access resources under new sets of 
institutional arrangements and how to begin to 
control the new sets of institutional arrangements 
for long-term social and economic gain. 
Such processes are virtually inevltable in any major 
envlronment of policy change. But in southern 
Africa, they have perhaps added weight given the 
political histones of oppression and denial of access 
to natural resources (Moyo 1991). Part of this 
linkage to local historical and political processes has 
been in the “messy” nature of policy and 
institutional change: reforms specific to natural 
resource envlronments have run in parallel to wder  
political or “governance” reforms (or changes, at 
least), the pre-eminent example of which in the 
1990s has been the shift to “decentralisation” of 
government (see article 7, this Bulletin). Put crudely, 
vertical sectoral policy questions with specific 
resource orientations cut through have not yet 
necessarily successfully engaged with broader 
lateral changes to the whole state-society 
relationship. This articulation has had a number of 
impacts and has emerging consequences for poor 
people’s access to resources such as water. 
The political histories attached to particular 
resources have therefore been of great importance 
in terms of this articulation with broader 
governance reform. Efforts at improving access to 
water by the poor and marginalised, largely black, 
populations in southern Africa have not just been 
tied to global concerns about poverty reduction, 
but also to region-specific contexts of class, power 
and race. Few of the current reform processes 
address such issues head on and instead are 
embedded in discourses on water management 
appropriated from global narratives and policy 
goals. Yet it is the “political histones” attached to 
reforms, perhaps invlsibly so, that really count at 
the local level and impede or assist their progress to 
successful implementation, let alone impact on the 
poor. As this article illustrates, it is the specifics of 
political issues that play a key part in determining 
the end result at a local level of national policy 
reform and implementation. 
The drivers of water policy reform that have 
emerged globally have been examined in an earlier 
phase of the SLSA work (Nicol 2003, see also 
Derman and Ferguson 2000). Key areas of influence 
of these “global narratives’’ on water development 
range from the issue of resource “securitisation” 
under perceptions of scarcity to the bundle of ideas 
embedded within “integrated water resources 
management” (IWRM), such as “user pays” and 
“stakeholder decision-making”. The latter IWRM 
approach in particular has become a powerful 
narrative in the construction of the new water 
policies in southern Afnca, as reflected, for instance, 
in the subtitle of Zimbabwe’s Water Resources 
Management Strategy: ‘Towards Integrated Water 
Resources Management’ (Government of Zimbabwe 
2001) and in Mozambiquek Water Policy, where it 
is stated that rational allocation requires an 
integrated management approach. The 
secuntisation of water (Ohlsson 1995; Tevera and 
Moyo 2000; Buzan et af 1998) has also had a major 
impact on supply structure development in the 
region particularly in South Africa (Turton and 
Henwood 2002), but also, to a lesser extent, in 
Zimbabwe (Zinyama 1995) 
The influence of donors, acting as lightning rods for 
conducting global narratives into national policies, 
has been significant. Regional networks supported 
by bilateral and multilateral donors including the 
Global Water Partnership’s regional Technical 
Advlsory Committee’ have played a key role; and 
some bilaterals have also actively promoted the 
concept of IWRM, including GTZ’ through its 
piloting of an international IWRM network in 
southern Africa. Southern Africa was chosen 
precisely because of a perceived “broad acceptance” 
by regional actors of the IWRM concept. Yet such 
concepts are created in politically benign or neutral 
environments and often are supported by little 
knowledge of their capacity to function wthin more 
politically contentious environments. In southern 
Afnca, though, there are no IWRM easy solutions 
(for a useful discussion of this in the Zimbabwean 
context, see Manzungu et a/. 1999) 
Drawng particularly on detailed case study work 
from southeastern Zimbabwe, this article identifies 
and examines three key areas in water reform 
processes: 
1 The process of institution-building that 
accompanies policy reform and the impact of 
establishing new structures in contested 
political environments (both formal and 
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informal), leading to sometimes perverse 
anticipated and unanticipated outcomes. 
The different meanings attached to water by 
different stakeholders and the implications of 
these contested meanings being brought into 
new decision-making processes under new 
institutional structures. 
The “grey area” in much policy development 
that allows water used productively, but at the 
domestic level, either to be excluded from 
decision-making in policy arenas, or to be 
misunderstood in terms of its links to poverty 
reduction and the behaviour of new 
institutions at a local level (including, cntically, 
the importance of livestock use and access to 
water as a key part of the household asset 
structure and as major coping mechanisms in 
times of drought (see Kinsey et al. 1998)). This 
also bnngs ambiguities to difficult policy areas, 
such as cost recovery and the raising of 
and the understanding that water had both 
economic and social value. The 1995 policy also 
enshnned the pnnciple of management at the most 
appropnate level. 
Much of the policy shift taking place in 
Mozambique represented alignment w t h  emerging 
global narratives on water resource management, 
particularly those espoused by major lending 
institutions (and loudly explicated in documents 
produced by the World Bank (see for example, 
World Bank 1993)). This was not surprising given 
the “opening up” of Mozambique’s economy at this 
time. Important new institutions to emerge 
included the National Water Council (1991). w t h  
a policy remit, an implementing arm - the National 
Water Directorate - and Adminitraceos Regional de 
Apes (Am). The latter were public institutions 
working to undertake decentralised nver basin 
management, including basin-level development 
planning, water usage regulation and user fee 
collection. 
revenues through water charging.’ 
Water supply delivery in Mozambique has been 
The next four sections first examine in broad 
outline the major policy context to water reforms 
in southern A h a ;  second, they examine the three 
themes above in some detail w t h  respect to the 
case study work. Finally, they draw some 
conclusions as to possible policy development and 
implementation options that could address some of 
these cntical issues. 
2 Policy change in southern Africa 
2.1 Mozambique 
Mozambique’s water sector shifted from a highly 
centralised to a more decentralised system during 
the 1990s. The Water Law (1991) opened up the 
sector to pnvate firms, autonomous utilities and 
water users associations and launched much of the 
subsequent institutional change One of the more 
significant aspects of the Law was its distinction 
between “common” and pnvate usage of water; the 
one subject to fee collection. the other not. 
Following the Law, in 1995 the National Water 
Policy established a set of pnnciples for supply 
management that made “basic needs” a prionty 
(but wthout defining what such needs explicitly 
were), as well as the participation of beneficianes 
hampered by the legacy of civll war and an 
uncoordinated approach leading to very low levels 
of provision into the mid-1990s. In 1997, the new 
Rural Water Transition Plan increased the level of 
technical expertise in the provinces and led to the 
establishment of a national community-level 
approach. Nevertheless, while this helped to 
increase the co-ordination and coherence of sernce 
delivery approaches, local capacity to undertake 
community-based approaches remains low and 
actual data on coverage and demand is often scant 
or unavailable. In addition, there have been wder  
debates about the efficacy of seeking “full cost 
recovery” and the subcontracting provlsion to 
pnvate operators in pen-urban areas 
2.2 South Africa 
In post-apartheid South Afnca huge infrastructure 
development was required to enable service 
provision in many formerly neglected township 
and rural areas, but was also a major political 
imperative for the new government. In short. there 
was a forceful combination of political demand and 
basic need, which had to fill the vacuum between 
promises of black political empowerment and 
tangible improvements in the quality of life at a 
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local level. The legacy of apartheid development 
was a skewed sector, focused on the interests of 
industrial, mining and white commercial farming 
interests; the independent “homelands” were 
largely excluded from this development process 
(Abrams 1996). The results were a massive 
unsemced population which, in 1994 according to 
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 
amounted to some 12-14 million people without 
formal water supplies and at least half the 
population with no formal sanitation. 
The new policy and institutional processes set in 
train with the election of a black majority 
government included the promulgation of a 
National Water Policy (1997), a Water Services Act 
(1997) and, finally, the National Water Act (1998). 
This process created new institutional roles and 
responsibilities, including new catchment 
management agencies (CMAs) that would meet 
demand for the resources, as well as provide the 
means by which to increase public participation in 
management. In common with many other 
countries of the region this represented an 
embodiment of the concepts of IWRM within 
complex local and national political environments. 
The Water Act revolutionised the sector, 
introducing the concept of a strategic reserve w t h  
which to meet environmental sustainability 
objectives and the guaranteeing of basic human 
needs. At a catchment level it was envisaged that 
management charges would cover the actual costs 
of management actiwties. However, the rolling out 
of this type of management structure has been 
slower than anticipated, largely due to the 
complexity of the task and the enormous shift 
represented in allocation priorities by the inclusion 
of new stakeholders on the CMAs. 
The 1994 paper on Community Water Supply and 
Sanitation signalled an important shift from 
supply-side to demand-based management, 
embedding principles of demand-responsive 
approaches and community-based management in 
national service delivery strategies. Build Operate 
Train and Transfer (BOTT) schemes were designed 
to speed up  the delivery of new servlces by 
bringing in private sector expertise. However, there 
were various assumptions inherent, including that 
communities would be able to provide for 100 per 
cent cost recovery and that municipal government 
would be able to take on the process of managing 
the new service structures after a gven period. 
This placed considerable demands on some 
municipal governments, at a time when this level of 
government was only in an emergent form, leading 
to some severe criticism and concern that they were 
not effective means by which to establish long-term, 
sustainable approaches to community supply Until 
the late 1990s the BOTT schemes were regarded as 
the way forward, bringing public and private 
delivery together with local, community-based 
management (Nicol 2003). Increasingly, the 
approach has been superseded by a concern to 
ensure a free basic water requirement to 
households. South Africa is the only country that 
constitutionally acknowledges the human right to 
water, going against current donor agendas that 
stress cost-recovery issues instead of rights-based 
ones. However, as SLSA Research Paper 17 shows, 
South Africa’s rights-based approaches to water are 
often hindered by parallel attempts to recover costs, 
which are in keeping with international donor 
discourses. Moreover, several institutional and 
political factors hinder the implementation of its 
free and basic water policy They include problems 
with cross-subsidisation in rural areas, a lack of 
clarity of the duties and responsibilities of various 
implementing agencies and the poor capacity of 
municipal governments to implement the policy. 
2.3 Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe’s reform process has mirrored South 
Africak, particularly the increasing emphasis on 
new forms of integrated water management at the 
catchment level. Reforms have in fact progressed 
further in terms of implementation, largely due to 
the less complex water management questions in 
Zimbabwe, with fewer competing demands for 
water wthin key basins. 
The 1998 Water Act came into force in January 
2000 and paved the way for a new system of 
decentralised water management institutions. It 
not only shifted the institutional environment 
towards an IWRM model, but also fundamentally 
altered the basis on which water was apportioned, 
managed and paid for New catchment and sub- 
catchment councils (CCs and SCCs) became 
responsible for managing water resources, issuing 
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permits and creating an effective user-management 
interface. The Act transformed the Water Resources 
Department into the Zimbabwe National Water 
Authority (ZINWA), a new parastatal funded 
through user fee collection through sub-catchment 
councils. The new government Water Strategy 
document stated that: ‘ZINWA is to operate along 
commercial lines, generating its own resources for 
operation and maintenance of infrastructure and 
contracting commercial loans for capital 
development in its own nght’ (Government of 
Zimbabwe 2001). 
Water supply delivery in Zimbabwe was a similarly 
important political issue, particularly during the 
post-1980 independence period. Extended basic 
servlce delivery through provision of boreholes 
became a key government objective in the first 
decade post-independence. In the 199Os, 
particularly as structural adjustment squeezed 
government budgets further, an increasing focus on 
cost recovery emerged under the influence of 
external agencies and in parallel to new 
community-based management processes. 
In common with both South Afnca and 
Mozambique these water reform processes 
emerged as decentralisation to local government 
(Rural District Councils) and, ostensibly, a form of 
“democratic decentralisation” took root. The 
complex interrelationships between these 
processes are an important feature of the current 
policy reform process regon-wide (see article 7, 
this Buffehn). In Zimbabwe, as in neighbouring 
countnes, the political landscape is, to some 
extent, being shaped by the relationships between 
these reform processes. New types of political 
expression are emerging and the ways in which 
demands for basic services are articulated are 
increasingly a function of the relations between 
new sector-specific management institutions and 
broader governance structures at a local level. 
3 Key thematic issues 
3.1 Institutions can change: the roles 
people play may not 
Institutional change within the reform process has 
been significant. It has created an institutional 
“melee” that has contnbuted to some confusion 
over roles and responsibilities particularly given 
changes to the types of task undertaken by 
managers and local political actors. 
lnstitutional complexity 
Research in Chiredzi district in Zimbabwe has 
shown how responsibility for promion of new 
water supply services has been diffused between a 
number of sometimes competing institutions, 
which include government departments and non- 
governmental organisations. In some communal 
areas, combined with the overall shift from central 
government to decentrahsed, local-authority based 
promion, a scramble for responsibilities and 
control by different institutional actors has 
resulted. One of the key reasons for this was noted 
by an informant who stated that: 
While in the past the office of the DA [Distnct 
Administrator] was happy to control water 
provision and development in a distnct as 
drought stricken as Chiredzi, one should not 
fail to see the political interest in that. Through 
the office of the DA, central government, which 
is synonymous with the ruling party, may 
provide water to wards and vlllages that voted 
for the ruling party. In this light, one may 
unwllingly hand over responsibilities for water 
development to the next office. The office of 
the DA may still want to maintain a co- 
ordinating role for political ends.‘ 
In other cases, the institutional complexity relates 
to the “type” of water that users are accessing. The 
question is complicated for imgators in lowveld 
Zimbabwe, depending on whether they are using 
nver water, in which case they need to access the 
sub-catchment council, or water behind a dam, 
known as “agreement water”, in which case they 
need to go directly to the newly-established 
ZINWA office. A lack of awareness can prompt 
users without the relevant knowledge to waste 
considerable amounts of time in trymg to resolve 
their water management issues. The chairperson of 
a sub-catchment council in the lowveld stated: 
The truth is that people in Lower Save sub- 
catchment do not know what is going on wth  
regard to water reforms. First, they still consult 
their respective rural district councils about 
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water issues. Secondly, they do not know the 
difference between ZINWA and sub-catchment 
councils - they think it’s one and the same 
thing (SLSA Research Paper 14. 37).’ 
Institutional complexity has been compounded by 
the broader decentralisation process 
Responsibility for distnct-level development lies 
w t h  the RDCs, yet catchment and sub-catchment 
councils as well as the Zimbabwe National Water 
Authority and its local-level offices, are 
decentrahsed institutions in their own nght with a 
broad mandate to manage water in respective 
catchment boundaries Two areas of confusion 
anse. first, these boundaries often cut across two or 
three council areas making participation in the 
catchment councils problematic (who has the 
greatest stake, who can attend meetings?); second, 
the water management mandate of the SCCs and 
CCs raises important development questions, 
including who and what should receive new 
permits for water use? 
The decentralisation process created villages, wards 
and rural distnct councils, which have become the 
official focal administrative points. Given their 
political role, too, they also naturally become the 
focus for complaints and disagreements over 
resource use. Confusion on “where to go” with 
water issues was outlined by the Chief Executive 
Officer of Chimanimani Rural Distnct Council. 
People are not aware of where to go with their 
water quenes.. .naturally most people come to 
the rural distnct council because it is their local 
authonty. . .  We constantly tell people that 
water issues in some parts of Chimanimani - 
from the Skyline Junction. town area, Rusitu, 
Ndima to the surrounding areas - report to 
Budzi sub-catchment council which is in 
Chipinge district The other parts, Nyanyadzi 
and Cashel areas report to different sub- 
catchment councils. You see, i tk  complicated 
(SLSA Reseurch Paper 14: 39) 
This institutional divlsion makes both reporting 
and participation problematic. Some areas of these 
catchment areas might be important hydrologically, 
for instance in terms of upstream catchment, but 
remote logistically and therefore difficult to elicit 
participation from. 
Participation 
As well as the institutional complexity and the 
emergence of overlapping and competing interests 
involved in institutional responsibility, there has 
also been growing complexity in the roles and 
functions of participants in many of the new 
institutions. The nature of participation has 
changed substantially and the expectations of the 
types of participation has brought with it 
competing demands and challenges. In some cases 
the outcomes appear to stack the benefits of 
participation against “new stakeholders” (read poor 
communal farmers), particularly when high 
transaction costs are taken into account. One local 
chief who participated in a new catchment 
management process in Zimbabwe outlined his 
expenence. 
At first we were not given any money for bus 
fare We went to attend the meetings when we 
have our own business to do in town. We 
pushed for transport allowances, and then we 
were recently given Z$500. . This money is 
not even adequate for transport, so what about 
food? Do 1 have to travel from my home to 
starve in the name of a sub-catchment council 
meeting? No! . , , This is the main reason why 
people from Chimanimani, particularly myself, 
do not attend these meetings (SLSA Research 
Paper 14: 40). 
Not surprisingly, the whole philosophy behind 
participation has changed substantially. The new 
politics of inclusiveness, at least as stated formally, 
has encouraged participation at the grassroots in 
water management. Yet for much of the twentieth 
century in southern Africa and particularly in 
countnes such as Zimbabwe and South Africa, the 
legal and administrative frameworks governing 
ownership, access, control and use of water 
favoured elite - often racially defined - interests, 
notably commercial farming and mining. 
Communal populations in countries such as 
Zimbabwe were legally denied access to, and use 
of, water for secondary purposes, such as irrigation 
(e g. through the Water Act of 1976, which tied 
together land and water rights through the 
legalisation of npanan rights) 
New forms of participation thus must confront 
such historical legacies. With such skewed access 
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typifying past arrangements, the recent flurry of 
rights-based legislation is proving difficult to realise 
in practice The new emphasis on “stakeholder 
participation” is also throwing up new political 
challenges at the local level, including the relative 
roles and powers of informal as opposed to formal 
systems of authority Whilst the assigned roles 
under new legislation and institutional structures 
might suggest an orderly picture of responsibility 
and overall co-ordination, the reality is that roles 
are flexible and their nature and success in practice 
depends greatly on the individuals who assume 
them. During the recent political turbulence in 
Zimbabwe the wider roles expected of traditional 
leaders have sometimes led to conflict with formal 
systems of authority if, in practice, their “authority” 
does not match external expectations (see SLSA 
Research Paper 3 ) .  Thus, in some areas, sabhuku 
(village headmen) who are not politically 
connected to the ruling party have been sidelined 
in the process of local-level resource development 
Water committee members call for meetings 
instead of the sabhuhu, and rule enforcement is 
undertaken by caretakers and councillors. While 
their valuable role in community mobilisation may 
be stated in policy, this may be compromised by 
political allegiances elsewhere One such situation 
was revealed by a sabhuku who was contesting the 
authority of the ruling party in the new political 
arena: 
1 have been campaigning for a different 
candidate for ZANU(PF) primary elections 
from the Councillork. I t  has been like that for 
many years . , , Unfortunately, the candidate 
that I have been rallyng behind continually 
lost to the Councillor‘s candidate. Since it has 
been viewed as a cnme, 1 have been excluded 
in all those issues The Councillor says to the 
people, “it’s me who sourced [money] for the 
boreholes”, so they work with him more 
closely than myself 1 have nothing to do with 
it (SLSA Rcwarch Paper 15 15) 
Transient institutions 
Another key issue to emerge is the potential 
transience of institutions. The image often portrayed 
externally is that of permanent institutional 
“solutions” to development “problems”, particularly 
in local-level resource management Community 
management is seen as a long-term solution. Yet, in 
some cases, this may in fact be merely only a 
transient solution One example from the Zimbabwe 
research has shown how local-level institutions may 
even be victims of their own success. A communal 
well and garden project in Chiredzi district worked 
well for three years before people started to realise 
their profits. With increasing individual profit the 
incentive for collective action diminished, and many 
instead began to sink their own wells and establish 
gardens at their respective homes. This led to a state 
of project “dormancy” with nominal members of the 
original committee simply staying on in case they 
could capture future rewards from the o n p a l  
source of project financing (SLSA Research Paper 15). 
3.2 Meanings and resistance 
As policy narratives shift, so do the meanings 
attnbuted to water and its use. But these may not 
chime w t h  local understandings of water and its 
place in rural livelihoods This contestation of 
meanings has become heightened as a result of new 
water reforms, often resulting in confusion for the 
very water users the reforms were supposed to 
assist. One farmer from Zimbabwe observed: 
We as Chinyaduma Farmers’ Coop don’t know 
what is happening at Budzi [Sub-catchment 
Councill, . . . we are forced to pay for water . 
we don’t know why we are payng . we want 
to use water in Chako Dam to imgate our tea 
but we don’t know what to do to get the water. 
I’m told that we should apply to Budzl, that’s 
why I came here [Budzi SCC offices] to get an 
explanation. . . We are not refusing to pay 
because there is nothing for free these days, but 
what we want to know is why we are paying 
and how can one small-scale farmer get 
involved ( S E A  Rcscarch Paper 14: 27).* 
In this case, the lack of understanding of the water 
reforms was not a trigger for resistance, rather for 
bewilderment about what should be done. 
However, in other cases significant resistance is 
generated. Across the region, as global narratives 
on water as an economic good, which came to 
prominence from the mid- 1990s onwards, have 
filtered into policy-making, they increasingly come 
up against local narratives on the cultural and 
social meanings attached to water resources. 
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The water reforms in Zimbabwe are a case in point, 
where the concept of water with costs attached to 
its delivery (even if it seemingly flows naturally 
towards the user) grates against ideas of 
community and communal resources based on 
local meanings, beliefs and concerns. In Budzi sub- 
catchment, which covers Chimanimani and 
Chipinge Districts, most inhabitants are ethnically 
Ndau. For the Ndau, water is a “God-gwen” natural 
resource, just as the land is in which it is found. 
Similarly to land, water forms a central element in 
Ndau worship, but is viewed as more than the 
physical form in which it is found. It attains a 
religious dimension and becomes that natural 
resource ‘the people receive when ancestral spints 
are approached to intercede for a successful rainy 
season’ and which ‘ancestral spirits make available 
in certain rivers and springs even in the event of 
the mother of all droughts’.‘ Thus the custodian of 
water is the chief and his people, and the ultimate 
owners are the ancestral spirits. The corollary is 
that traditional leaders and communal farmers 
have access to water because it belongs to them and 
their ancestors, which posits a conception of 
ownership often at odds w t h  outsider news of 
how the resource is perceived locally (see Monarty 
and Love11 1998: 18). Access to water 1s therefore 
gained (and governed) by acceptance as a member 
of the spintual community, and wllingness to 
respect the ancestral spirits of an area. Access to 
water through traditional institutions and 
associated narratives also gives water a 
transcendental quality that links the livelihoods 
and religous aspects of communal area people 
(SLSA Research Paper 14). 
The meanings of the resource are therefore as 
confused, in terms of imported notions of what 
water “IS”, as are the meanings of community as 
commonly received by intervening agencies (see 
Blench 1998). The neat, terntonal definition falls 
down under this more complex notion of 
belonging and membership. This has important 
implications for water management across the 
region. The politics involved in such cases are as 
much about definition of community as the 
relationships between communities themselves. 
In the Sangwe communal area in Zimbabwe, the 
term “community” and its extension “community 
water point” is vanously defined and interpreted, 
and each definition and interpretation is associated 
with a unique set of rules governing access to water. 
The traditional notion of “community” denotes a 
group of people who live in the same geographical 
area, share a common history and cultural hentage, 
and fall under the same chieftainship. In addition, 
these groups of people share common interests and 
control of natural resources. People in Ward 1, for 
example, are commonly referred to as, vanhu vekwa 
Gudo, meaning all the people who fall under the 
jurisdiction and chieftainship of Chief Gudo and to 
whom access to local natural resources is open. 
With respect to water, members of the Gudo 
community have unfettered access to natural 
spnngs provided that certain customary rules are 
complied with - breaching these rules is believed to 
cause spnngs to dry up. 
However, new approaches to water point 
management have challenged this traditional 
system, not least by assuming new meanings for 
“community”. Community in this case refers to a 
group of people shanng a water and sanitation 
facility.Io Thus, a borehole drilled in Musindo 
nllage becomes a Musindo community borehole; 
and access to the water is limited to people residing 
in the nllage itself. Further, with community-based 
management, access may further be limited to 
people who have contnbuted water point fees. 
Community-based management introduced new 
definitions defined by proximity to the water 
points and ability to pay, while discarding 
traditional notions characterised by the 
commonalities of history, culture, tradition, 
chieftainship and ancestral spints. The result has 
been that Gudo members may “flout” new rules 
governing access on the basis that they have a right 
to fetch water wherever it is found because “water 
is for everyone”. Research found that the extension 
of the traditional notion of community from 
natural spnngs to boreholes resulted in many 
villagers not contributing to water point fees, and 
fetching water at any borehole they wshed (SLSA 
Research Paper 15). 
Changmg availability of water also has the effect of 
shifting community “boundaries”, as traditionally 
depicted. The community effectively becomes 
defined by the extent of its water point “users”. 
When a community water point is functioning, the 
“catchment community’’ of a water point may 
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expand, but if it is malfunctioning and there is a 
need to contribute financially towards the 
maintenance and repairing of the borehole, the 
community contracts. The boundaries of 
communal responsibility and “ownership” may be 
inversely proportional to the availability (and cost) 
of water. Consequently, borehole maintenance is a 
major issue at the local level Often, at a regional 
level, the concept of instilling a “sense of 
ownership” is repeated by agencies and in 
particular NGOs, over and over again. This 
concept of ownership appears rooted in a 
preconceived idea of what an “owner” looks like, 
which is fixed across time and space. Added to this 
is the practical difficulty of implementation. In 
some parts of Sangwe, the longer-term process of 
building ownership and community capacity to 
manage even in favourable community 
circumstances was frequently reported to be 
hurried and piecemeal. Many respondents 
criticised the training as a “one-off” event with no 
follow-up and refresher courses. In some cases, 
too, the trainers were more interested in future 
work in maintaining the pumps than in actually 
transfemng skills to communities (SLSA Research 
Paper 15). 
Similarly in South Africa, a legacy of government 
provision and control has rendered attempts at 
community-level management problematic. As 
Zolile Ntshona and Edward Lahiff observe in 
relation to Mdudwa village in the former Transkei: 
The critical issue facing water schemes in the 
Eastern Cape is their maintenance. Many 
schemes have now been implemented but few 
are operating as intended, mainly due to poor 
maintenance. This, in turn, is widely attributed 
to the general lack of a sense of ownership 
among users, with the schemes being wdely 
viewed as government property People in 
Mdudwa are still waiting for “the government” 
to come; and make their scheme function 
properly and unless this happens it appears 
unlikely that the standpipes w11 ever operate as 
intended ( S E A  Research Paper 5: 27). 
In terms of catchment level management, meanings 
and their attachment to resources are similarly a 
contested area The process by which the new 
narrative on water as an economic good has 
become established within refom processes has 
been particularly controversial. In Zimbabwe the 
abruptness of “learning” about the new reforms 
and ways of understanding the resource-user 
relationships was occasionally vividly 
demonstrated: ‘1 came to know of Budzi SCC when 
I saw a young man on a motorcycle who had come 
with a receipt for water charges . . . which I knew 
nothing about’’‘ was how one small-scale farmer 
explained the new situation. Another stated that: 
‘last year the levy was Z$200 and this year it is 
Z$2000. I don’t know how it was raised and why? 
But whether I know it or 1 don’t, I have to pay’ 
(SLSA Research Paper 14: 271.” Resistance to the 
new system was also put forward in some cases: 
‘Why pay for water and whose water is it anyway’ 
. . . If you can show and prove to me that the water 
I am drinking is ZlNWA water I will pay. . . . This IS 
our water from time immern~rial . ’~~ 
The roles played by “new stakeholders” in all 
countries. were in flux during the period of the 
research. In Zimbabwe, this was particularly acute, 
due to the land resettlement process. In some 
instances the narratives of access to land, so 
strongly pushed by the war veterans lobby, have 
been extended to water. The Chairperson of the 
Zimbabwe National Wealth Recovery Matsiyo 
Project, an association of 105 newly-resettled 
farmers at Wolfscrag farm, stated, for example, 
that: ‘we do not want to steal this dam from him (a 
commercial farmer), but to share with him the 
water, just as we are sharing the farm. There IS 
enough water in the dam for all of us’.” Thus, there 
is perhaps the beginnings of an articulated vision 
for water and livelihoods among new settlers, with 
many now recognising that gaining access to land 
is only one part of the wider struggle for 
livelihoods 
3.3 Water is first and foremost a 
livelihood resource: management 
should reflect this fact 
The two previous sections have helped to illustrate 
some of the complexity that new reforms in the 
water sector are both generating and meeting in 
rural areas in southern Afnca, focusing specifically 
on Zimbabwe. However, there is a further factor in 
the reform process that may prove of great 
significance in terms of future poverty reduction 
49 
impact. This is the apparent “grey area” between 
what is understood in regional policy documents 
and institutions as a basic, domestic or “pnmary 
supply” and what is additional to this level and 
deemed commercial usage and which should be 
paid for at cost. 
The significance of this “grey area” is in 
understanding the role of water in household 
livelihoods and what impact charging for given 
quantities may have on these livelihoods. 
Increasingly there is a recognition that insufficient 
account has been made of household livelihood 
uses, ranging from livestock production to small 
household gardens and cottage industry, within 
water sector reform processes, specifically the lack 
of commitment to ensuring that this domestic 
“plus” level of water is available, reliable and 
affordable.” 
The residual influence of large-scale farming is 
understandably evident in many of the new 
“integrated water management institutions”. 
Systems developed to allow bottom-up revenue 
collection largely depend on these large-scale 
farmers being charged for water supply in order to 
generate significant revenue streams at fairly low 
relative administrative cost. Charging many smaller 
farmers smaller amounts provides for a far greater 
institutional headache. Now that the land reform 
programme has brought about the comprehensive 
dismemberment of many large-scale commercial 
farms in Zimbabwe the nature of the institutional- 
user interface has changed substantially in many 
areas. Previously in Budzi sub-catchment, for 
instance, nearly all commercial farmers have (or 
had) water nghts on rivers that flowed through 
their farms. Of the more than 500 water rights in 
Budzi sub-catchment, more than 90 per cent 
belonged to predominantly white commercial 
farmers. Many commercial farmers mewed the 
access and use of water by communal farmers, 
particularly newly-resettled farmers, as leading to 
’massive land degradation, siltation and 
disappearance of nvers’. To this end, the major 
concern of commercial farmers, Budzi and Lower 
Save sub-catchment councils and indeed the Save 
Catchment Council, was with the establishment of 
conservation measures in upstream catchments 
(SLSA Research Paper 14). The establishment of 
effective service delivery and water resources 
development that benefited emerging small-scale 
farmers has been largely off the agenda of many 
institutions. 
Yet the linkage between water and household 
livelihoods is crucial in order for the new water 
users and participants in the institutions truly to be 
stakeholders in management processes. At present 
there is largely tokenistic and partial participation 
for a vanety of reasons, including the opportunity 
and transaction costs involved in participation. It 
should be no surprise that the process is inherently 
politicised. In Sangwe communal area, for 
example, the provlsion of boreholes has been a 
“reward” for supporters of the local MP and 
councillors. 
Understanding the limits to participation and 
payment are therefore crucial in assessing the likely 
impact of water sector reforms on rural livelihoods. 
There are fine thresholds in household income that 
determine ability or inability to contribute towards 
repairs and maintenance. In contexts of extreme 
livelihood vulnerability, with increasing 
unemployment, intermittent and declining 
remittance income, and the burden of HIV/AIDS 
(see article 2, this Bulletin), the longer-term 
planning and management of financing is 
extremely difficult, making cost-recovery a major 
implementation challenge. 
4 Conclusions 
The drive to reform water policy in Zimbabwe, 
specifically and in southern Africa, more generally, 
has been bound up with a variety of goals. These 
are based around global narratives on managng 
water under perceived conditions of scarcity, better 
ways of achievlng efficient management structures 
and the creation of viable community management 
and financing mechanisms. Yet these sector-centnc 
goals are overlain by broader political agendas 
arising out of complex political histories in which 
control, exploitation and, in many cases, 
subordination of large sections of the population 
have taken place. 
Within this environment the institutional 
development required to establish viable structures 
and decision-making processes will have to adjust 
to political realities at a local level, but also seek to 
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engage with these realities through creating greater 
linkage to the broader governance reforms taking 
place. This means connecting resource governance 
institutions more effectively to processes of 
establishing and precipitating local demands for 
resources, through institutions of local government, 
including district councils and municipalities. 
This kind of political connectivity is likely to 
strengthen the resource management process and 
certainly create a basis for challenging some of the 
more entrenched resource-based interests at the 
local level. In the case of water supply, as well as 
water resource development processes, this entails 
the empowenng of local authonties wthin the 
catchment management process through increasing 
their role and stake in the water management 
process. One vehicle might be to seek ways of 
using some of the locally-generated revenues for 
specific resource development measures at a local 
level. Othewse  the process of charging for water 
remains an extractive one from the penphery to the 
centre. This could also serve the secondary 
purpose of using broader resource management 
revenues to cross-subsidise water supply 
developments for more deprived areas within 
distncts. At a more fundamental level, increasing 
local-level involvement in the councils could also 
help to facilitate the links between local 
knowledge, including the indigenous and 
competing narratives of meaning on the resource 
and decision-making and resource development 
processes at higher levels. 
The second major challenge is to create the means 
within these new institutional structures to 
understand the “grey area” of water for broader 
livelihoods uses and, at a minimum, to bring some 
clarity to the issues of payments for water usage 
that are non-commercial, yet go beyond the basic 
“pnmary” or domestic-level usage. Bringing greater 
local knowledge into decision-making, as well as 
increasing the linkage between decision-making in 
new institutions and the demands placed on local 
political actors, can help to encourage new 
stakeholders and decision-makers to make more 
informed choices on how to implement policy and, 
indeed, how to feedback to a national level the 
strengths or weaknesses in policy impact. 
At a broader level, these shifts would help to 
increase the feedback loop to national policy- 
makers and to encourage more flexible and 
dynamic policy processes that were inherently 
more responsive to demand, on the one hand, and 
able to establish levels and types of impact on the 
other. 
One major outstanding issue, particularly at the 
local level, will remain the challenges and 
competition over formal and informal systems of 
authority. Combining these systems of authonty in 
new institutions, may precipitate greater coherence 
in decision-making or, at the least, in addressing 
local community and household-level issues to 
policy-makers. At present there is evldence of 
considerable local level politicking over resource 
access and management which, in the long term, 
may serve to disenfranchise rural people and 
hinder resource development processes 
Moreover, access to natural resources has to be a 
starting point for policy-makers and planners not 
simply in sectoral institutions but in those that 
serve some form of “cross-cutting” role, for instance 
to local district councils and municipalities An 
awareness of water and livelihoods linkages can 
help to establish potential synergies between 
institutions at a local level, so that the actions of 
local councillors in facilitating demands, of local 
traditional elders in articulating demands from 
communities, and local key stakeholders 
themselves in these institutions, can be framed in a 
language of water availability, access and usage that 
both accords with and responds to rural household 
livelihoods. The real challenge is largely a political 
one and encompasses the basis of the resource, the 
ways in which that knowledge is articulated wthin 
institutions and the ways in which the user group 
and stakeholder participation processes can be 
used to establish more coherent approaches to 
common development problems at a local level 
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Notes 
This article draws, in particular, on SLSA Research 
Papers 14 and 15. The complete lw of these papers 
IS on page 116 of this Bulletin and full text versions 
are available at w . i d s  ac uk/slsa 
The Global Water Partnership5 policy influencing 
products also include documents such as the 
‘Framework for Action document’ (Global Water 
Partnership 2000a); TAC Background Paper No 4 on 
Integrated Water Resources Management (Global 
Water Partnership 2000b) and the IWRM toolbox 
(Global Water Partnership 2001). 
2. Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (German Society for Technical Co- 
operation) 
3. The difficulties of reconciling attempts towards cost 
recovery wth safeguarding people’s nghts to water is 
a further key theme that is dealt w th  in SLSA 
Research Paper 17 (and see article 8, this Bulletin) 
lntemew wth a Chiredzi District Council Official, 8 
October 2001 
5 .  Intemew with a Councillor, Sangwe Communal 
Area, 27 July 2002. 
6.  For a useful early dlscussion of some of the water 
reform processes and decentrallsation, see (Derman 
et al. 2000) For a broader critique of the 
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